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Abstract
The recent proliferation of mobile phones, with their many associated sensors, has
opened the door to an entirely new range of insights and applications with a host
of accompanying privacy concerns. In this thesis, we explore techniques for privacy
preservation, transparency, and auditing for mobile sensing applications and services.
We demonstrate the feasibility of privacy-conscious defaults with the deployment of
an open-source mobile sensing framework and examine the requirements for this as
a basis of a forced-transparency system. This system is then examined within the
scope of present legal and policy frameworks and assessed for use in both open and
closed source mobile sensing platforms and frameworks. Finally, we highlight the use
of a mobile application prototyping service as a means for early trend detection for
future privacy research.
Thesis Supervisor: Alex (Sandy) Pentland
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy has become a deeply concerning topic for web and mobile technology compa-
nies as the corrosion of user trust can emerge overnight - aided by the very platforms
and technology they turn against. As such, companies have become increasingly re-
sponsive to addressing privacy concerns as they arise. Example cases include Path
uploading the contents of iPhone and Android users' address books to their servers
to match friends that were on the service [Thampi, 2012] and the discovery by Nik
Cubrilovic in 2011 that Facebook cookies were persistent, even when the user was
logged out [Cubrilovic, 2011]. In both cases, the companies acted quickly to address
the issues and users' concerns. However, while the seepage of user trust was abated,
the financial success of technology companies combined with an increase in applicable
law has caught the attention of lawyers specializing in the litigation of class action
lawsuits (for example, on the day of Facebook's IPO they were hit with a fifteen bil-
lion dollar lawsuit for the tracking incident [DC, 2012]) and governmental regulators
and policy makers, such as in the case of Google's Street View cars collecting wifi
payloads [Fleischer, 2010] [CNIL, 2011] [Senate, 2010].
While lawsuits represent a legitimate tool in correcting the actions of companies
that have harmed users, recent decisions have lowered the barrier to state that "the
possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs; threat-
ened injury constitutes 'injury in fact.' " [Smith, 2010b] [Smith, 2010a]. If we wish
to preserve the innovation in this sector, then methods capable of protecting both
13
startups and users must exist.
1.1 Mobile Sensing
Since the introduction of phones like the Samsung SCH-S310 in 2005, which used an
accelerometer to allow the user to dial phone numbers by writing the numbers in the
air, mobile devices have shipped with an increasing number of internal sensors. If we
compare sensors accessible to a mobile application between the Samsung SCH-S310
(2005) and the Samsung Galaxy Nexus (2011) we see an increase from three accessible
sensors to nearly three dozen, perfectly aligning with the equivalent of a Moore's Law
for mobile sensors. These sensors have given the phone, and their applications, an
increasingly detailed view of the user; their environment; and, more recently, their
community.
These sensors are only useful if the phone is with the user - a challenge solved
over the past 30 years as we've witnessed a societal shift in human carrying behavior.
Regardless of culture or gender most humans now have a set of three "mobile essen-
tials" that they will select to take when out. Keys, cash, and a mobile phone. Likely
selected as they provide ready access to the essentials of modern life [Chipchase et al.,
2005].
It is through the combination of a phone's sensors/data streams and our nature to
keep them with us that has allowed our phones the potential to know us better than
we know ourselves. Access to the GPS module means our phone knows everywhere
we've been and where we are likely to be, in the future. The accelerometer gives the
phone insight into how active we are - turning something that was once just used
for early stage gestural interactions into a functional pedometer. Are you walking
and running or taking the bus or car? Each one leaves a unique signature. Even
something like Bluetooth, a technology designed to connect a phone to a headset or
other peripheral, can be used to detect other nearby phones [Aharony, 20121. From
here it is possible to generate a user's face-to-face social graph (see figure 1-1) - a
graph that is often far more indicative of human behavior than that of perceived
14
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Figure 1-1: Friends and Family Study Social Graphs
When combining the data from the roughly three-dozen different sensors/data
streams that are accessible on most modern day smartphones it becomes possible
to truly know someone better than they know themselves. A users health can be
monitored, notifying them or their physician if they are sick several days before they
realize they are sick [Madan et al., 2010]. Their next actions and purchasing decisions
can be predicted with surprisingly good accuracy [Pan et al., 2011], and incentives
can be constructed to best encourage behavioral change (such as increased physical
activity) [Ip, 2011].
1.2 Setting Defaults for Privacy in Code
Defaults exist throughout our lives. In the case of software, they are represented
as the choices made by the engineer, architect, manufacturer, lawyer, and/or other
party that set the baseline behavior that a user will experience when interacting with
15
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their product or service. Defaults influence our behavior as they nudge us towards
certain options and away from others. These default options may be designed and
implemented in order to influence user behavior or may simply be the result of an
arbitrary choice on the part of a developer.
1.2.1 Defaults for Users
Different social networks have made vastly different choices when deciding on defaults.
Twitter's default for content visibility is public with less than 10 percent of users
opting to limit the visibility of their accounts [Moore, 2009]. This has given them a
much greater potential for analytics, aggregated news, and monetization (regardless
as to whether or not they are fully leveraging the potential) as an expectation for
openness was built into the system. Facebook, on the other hand, began with a more
guarded and closed privacy approach and has slowly attempted to transition to a
more nuanced but public set of defaults which has left a gap in understanding for
users of the service [Liu et al., 2011].
In a Netscape study in 1998 it was determined that 40 percent of the traffic to its
homepage was a result of users not changing their default homepage on the Netscape
browser [Cranor and Wright, 2000]. Similarly, in a study by Jared Spool several
hundred Microsoft Word users were asked to submit their config.ini file [Spool, 2011].
This is the location where Microsoft Word stores the over one hundred and fifty
settings that are changeable by the user. After examining the user configurations it
was determined that 95 percent of users had changed zero defaults. To determine
if these numbers were influenced because Microsoft had carefully selected and fine
tuned the default configuration engineers from the company were contacted and it was
discovered that the default configuration was initialized to all zeros simply because
that was the easiest thing to do, at the time. Meaning, 95 percent of Word users in
the study were using and, presumably, not questioning a randomly configured version
of the software.
Even organ donations are impacted by defaults. In the United States, and many
countries, there exists a no-action default in association with organ donation [DHHS,
16
2012]. If you do not make a choice then it will be presumed that you did not want
the action (your organs being donated) to occur. Thus resulting in an incredibly low
rate of permission granting. When comparing countries in Europe on their effective
consent percentage for organ donation an order of magnitude difference exists between
those countries that have such an opt-out default versus those with an opt-in default
[Johnson and Goldstein, 2003].
1.2.2 Defaults for Developers
It is through these and similar examples that we can see the importance of defaults
in the design and implementation of systems. However, they do not only influence
the behavior of users, but also of developers as they are users of their tools and in
the same way as the users of the applications they make with those tools. Similarly,
the path of least resistance will be taken when attempting to design or implement
a feature within an application. Thus, it is important to ensure that the default
behaviors of the programming resources we utilize are designed to reflect engineering
development best practices. For the purposes of this thesis, we will be examining the
role and implementation of privacy defaults.
The concept of Privacy-by-Design illustrates one tactic for ensuring privacy protec-
tion in a developed product or service, and was specifically highlighted in a European
Commission report [Commission, 2010] and as part of the European Union's Data
Protection Directive. The concept is fairly simple. Instead of containing privacy as
the responsibility of one team or phase in the development process, it is incorporated
throughout the entire development process. According to [Langheinrich, 2001], the
primary principles to be incorporated and considered over the course of development
include:
1. Openness and transparency: There should be no secret record keeping.
This includes both the publication of the existence of such collections, as well
as their contents.
2. Individual participation: The subject of a record should be able to see and
17
correct the record.
3. Collection limitation: Data collection should be proportional and not exces-
sive compared to the purpose of the collection.
4. Data quality: Data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are
collected and should be kept up to date.
5. Use limitation: Data should only be used for their specific purpose by autho-
rized personnel.
6. Reasonable security: Adequate security safeguards should be put in place,
according to the sensitivity of the data collected.
7. Accountability: Record keepers must be accountable for compliance with the
other principles.
The flaw in Privacy-by-Design is that it sets the expectation and requirement for
constant vigilance on the part of the developer. It attempts to address the problem of
defaults for the users of software, but not for the developers designing and implement-
ing the software for the users. As such, default mechanisms for privacy preservation
on the development side would seem crucial for the cffcctivencss of Privacy-by-Design.
There do exist multiple technical strategies that can be used to address a deficit of
development defaults. One, Privacy Patterns, is based on the concept of software de-
sign patterns which allow for developers to draw on pre-designed solutions for some of
the most common challenges that they might face. Privacy Patterns focus on tackling
standard challenges with a privacy aware context, allowing us to solve many of the
challenges that will be faced by developers in a Privacy-by-Design mindset by default
[Doty et al., 2012]. For example, the Ambient Notice pattern is designed to address
the challenge of providing the user of an application with "unobtrusive, ongoing no-
tice of real-time location tracking" while the application is actively accessing their
location. The Privacy Patterns solution is that of "an ambient notice - unobtrusive,
non-modal, but available at a glance or from a simple action - when location data
18
is being accessed. The notice should provide opportunities for interaction: to learn
more about the use of data or to revoke permissions."
Figure 1-2: iPad Ambient Notice of Location Data Access
A second strategy, and the one of relevance for this thesis, is that of library or
framework defaults. As will be discussed in the case study in section 2.4 a breach
in trust occurs when a service does not meet the expectation of privacy and data
collection/use for a user. This, in addition to the Privacy Principles outlined above,
indicates the advantage of a framework with defaults that are adherent to providing
a limited set of data unless specifically needed to fulfill the application's purpose.
Presently, the Android operating system (of particular relevance to the application of
this strategy in section 2.3) uses a Capability-Based Security Model. In which, when
a user of an Android device visits the Android Play Store (recently renamed from the
Android Market) and decides to purchase or download an application they trigger
an install-time application permission system which lists the permissions that the
application needs in order to function properly [Felt et al., 2011]. These permissions
are divided in terms of stored data (pictures, contact list, text messages, etc) and
sensors (camera, accelerometer, GPS, etc). A user then has the option to grant the
application the requested permissions. If they do the application will proceed with
its installation.
An application either has or does not have access to a listed data or sensor. There
is no means for saying how an application intends to use the data or sensor, or what
they intend to keep internal to the device versus transmit away from the device. It
is here that we would wish to embed privacy defaults in a mobile sensor and data
19
stream collection library or framework. To give a specific example let us examine a
data request for recent phone calls. By default permissions an application will have
permissions to view the content contained in table 1.1. If the application did not
need access to particular pieces of this data, or did not need it in a human readable
format to complete its designated purpose then the application would be considered
to be overprivileged. If this was the case with our application, where it would not
be necessary to have access to this information in a human readable format to serve
the intended function of the application then the data collection API should return
no human readable text - in this case, phone numbers called, the names attached to
those numbers, and any other associated information. Instead, the default behavior
of the data collection framework could be to return a hashed value representing the
phone number and corresponding content.
If attempting to engineer a system to determine mutual called contacts between
users, this would be more than sufficient data. If it wasn't sufficient for the purposes
of an application, the default could easily be changed, in code, to allow for the appro-
priate level of access. The key is to constrain the data collected by the application to
that which is needed to complete its functions to prevent creating an overprivileged
state.
1.3 Thesis Questions
This thesis attempts to explore techniques for privacy preservation, transparency, and
auditing for mobile sensing applications and services.
1. Question 1: What methods exist to apply proper privacy preservation tech-
niques as the default settings for mobile application development?
2. Question 2: Can existing legal and policy structures be used to enforce ap-
propriate default settings and ensure transparency in data collection and use?
3. Question 3: How can we appropriately forecast trends in sensor and data use
by mobile applications and services and focus future privacy research before
20
Table 1.1: CallLog.Calls Class Summary
CACHEDNAME
CACHED NUMBERLABEL
CACHEDNUMBERTYPE
CONTENTITEMTYPE
CONTENT-TYPE
DATE
DEFAULTSORTORDER
DURATION
INCOMINGTYPE
ISREAD
MISSEDTYPE
NEW
NUMBER
OUTGOINGTYPE
TYPE
The cached name associated with the
phone number, if it exists.
The cached number label, for a custom
number type, associated with the phone
number, if it exists.
The cached number type (Home, Work,
etc) associated with the phone number, if
it exists.
The MIME type of a CONTENTURI
sub-directory of a single call.
The MIME type of CONTENTURI and
CONTENTFILTERURI providing a di-
rectory of calls.
The date the call occured, in milliseconds
since the epoch. Type: INTEGER (long)
The default sort order for this table
The duration of the call in seconds. Type:
INTEGER (long)
Call log type for incoming calls.
Whether this item has been read or oth-
erwise consumed by the user.
Call log type for missed calls.
Whether or not the call has been acknowl-
edged. Type: INTEGER (boolean)
The phone number as the user entered it.
Call log type for outgoing calls.
The type of the call (incoming, outgoing
or missed).
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String
String
String
String
String
String
String
String
int
String
int
String
String
int
String
mainstream adoption of applications is reached?
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Chapter 2
Copyleft as a Means for Data
Transparency in Mobile
Application Development
With the rise in smartphone application adoption, coupled with the increased sensing
and data collection capabilities of phones, it is important to consider mechanisms for
providing transparency to what data is collected in what forms. This chapter exam-
ines a two-fold strategy of using privacy-conscious default settings in open and closed
source data and sensor collection libraries and frameworks as well as reciprocity char-
acteristics of certain copyleft licenses as a means to achieve data-use transparency in
mobile application development. Additionally, it examines how the same goal could
be achieved without the existence of the inherent reciprocity in the given copyleft li-
censes through the implementation of an auditing approach in a closed-source system.
Next, the practical implementation of such a mobile sensing library is examined be-
fore looking at case studies examining the consequences of not taking a privacy-aware
approach to application development.
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Figure 2-1: Funf Sensing Info Overlay
2.1 Transparency of Data Collection via Library
or Framework
While default setting is important to set standards for application developers, it is
likewise important to provide oversight over what decisions are actually being imple-
mented. As the case studies in section 2.4 highlight, public pressure following the
discovery of improperly collected or utilized data has been a highly effective method
for modifying developer behavior in the absence of legislation. As such, we will ex-
plore two methods to ensure transparency - one method for open-source or copyleft
data collection libraries and one primarily designed for closed-source libraries (though
this method could be applied to open-source frameworks in some scenarios).
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2.1.1 Concept of Using Copyleft to Ensure Transparency
The requirement of reciprocity is common through most open source licenses. For
the purpose of this section, we will be referring directly to the GNU General Public
License and GNU Lesser General Public License, but application can be administered
through many other licenses. Simply, upon the distribution of a program (in our case,
a mobile phone application) the distributor must also provide access to the source
code if the license the code falls under is GPL or LGPL [GNU, 2007a] [GNU, 2007b].
This is generally meant as a means to ensure that enhancements made to an open
source program or library are, themselves, fed back into the project or community,
and, in some cases, meant as a means to provide an advantage to open source software
over proprietary software.
In the case of a data and sensor framework, we can use the requirement to "commit
back" as a means to reveal both the schema of data collected and the derivations made
from the default data collection schema. The first is something known already via
explicit permission requirements for application installation. However, the second
allows for a nuanced view of what level of data access is present and is only revealed
when the modified source code is revealed. By allowing the defaults of the framework
to be easily modified, it becomes possible to quickly check the difference between the
defaults and actual settings.
It should be noted that this method does rely on the good faith of developers
following the licensing terms that require reciprocity of code.
2.1.2 Concept of Using Copyright to Ensure Transparency
In the case of a copyrighted library or framework, it is still possible to embed a mech-
anism for transparency. Where the copyleft mechanism relied on the terms requiring
reciprocity, the copyright mechanism relies on the technical solution of application au-
diting and reporting by the underlying framework. This would require modifications
to the framework, itself.
1. Accessible API for settings: A defined interface for accessing data and
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selecting the granularity of data required (if not defined by the default) must
be provided.
2. Internal framework auditing: For each app installation or a select num-
ber of installations to avoid overwhelming the audit's server side systems, the
framework must generate and transmit the schema of requested data to an audit
server with the identifying information for the application.
3. Accessible interface for human auditing: Whether public, or internal to
a watch-dog organization, the appropriateness level of data collected by an
application can be examined and reported on.
This methodology requires additional effort on the part of the framework devel-
oper to create and maintain the infrastructure for auditing. In the case of the copyleft
mechanism, even if the original developer does not implement or fails to maintain an
auditing system another developer or watch-dog actor could take their place as the
data is inherently public. The only requirement would be in the initial implementa-
tion of the framework to set default data standards. Additionally, legitimate concerns
could exist for developers. They must be able to trust that the framework is trans-
mitting only the schemas and relevant auditing data in addition to ensuring its value
as a more powerful or easier to use data collection framework.
In its favor, the copyright auditing method allows for a more standard and auto-
mated auditing framework. With a unified API for both data collection and default
setting coupled with not being reliant on the developer's release of code, new appli-
cations can be automatically added to the system and changes to the data collection
schema can be detected without intervention.
For either the copyleft or copyright versions of ensuring transparency in the data
collection process there still exists the issue of motivating developer buy in to the con-
cept. Per signaling theory, such data auditing could become the preferred preference
for a population of app developers over time. Those developers willing to reveal their
data collection schemas hold a public perception advantage in that they are willing
to be open. This transparency, if deemed important enough to the public to drive
26
consumer adoption or avoidance, would inherently motivate other developers to apply
similar transparency methods. Secondly, this could be seen positively as a develop-
ment tool allowing a product manager to oversee the level of data collection across
an entire development team. In this context, the auditing process can be applied
to both in-development and deployed applications for the developers and consumers,
respectively.
2.2 Motivations for Using an Existing Framework
In much the same way that design patterns increase the reusability of programming
constructs, using an existing legal framework that has already been accepted and
tested by the open source community lowers the barrier to implementation. Addi-
tionally, by leveraging existing language within certain copyleft licenses it is possible
to bypass the introduction of an entirely new and complex privacy framework, which
runs a higher risk of failing as has been seen with previous attempts [Schwartz, 2009].
The add-on strategy, in this case, additionally isolates the system from needing a
critical mass of acceptance. Acceptance and implementation by a single project is
not constrained by network externality requirements and can be effective within its
domain.
It is for these reasons that existing copyleft licenses are ideal to serve as a vehicle
for implementation.
2.3 Analysis of a Framework's Practical Use
Funf, a mobile sensing Android framework, was developed at the MIT Media Lab's
Human Dynamics group for deployment in the Friends and Family Study. The study
was the latest in a series of reality mining experiments to use mobile phones as a sensor
platform to come out of the Human Dynamics group [Eagle and (Sandy) Pentland,
2006]. Initiated through a pilot phase in March of 2010 and expanded in September
2010, the study aimed to use a graduate community of 150 individuals to both un-
27
derstand how people make decisions (both from an individual and social perspective)
and how we can enable people to make better decisions through appropriate feedback
loops and social incentive mechanisms. The study resulted in over a million hours (or
one hundred and seventeen years) of observational human data including thirty mil-
lion sensor scan events, fourteen million accelerometer scans, two hundred thousand
phone calls, one hundred thousand text messages, and sixteen thousand submitted
daily surveys.
Table 2.1: Subset of Friends and Family Study Dataset
Data Type Number of Entries
Sensor Scan Events 30,000,000
Accelerometer Scans 14,000,000
Wifi Scans 20,000,000
Scanned Devices 16,000,000
Phone Calls 200,000
GPS Locations 200,000
SMS Messages 100,000
Facebook Activity 26,000
Daily Surveys 16,000
Due to the sensitive nature of the data being collected over the course of the
study, it was important to set up intentional privacy and security barriers. Between
the participants and the study managers all human readable text from the phones was
hashed - making it possible to tell that multiple people were talking about the same
thing, or talking to the same person, but not having access to their phone number
or the content of the messages. Secondly, all data from the study was contained on,
and could not be removed from, internal Media Lab servers.
At the conclusion of the study we released the codebase (Funf) under the GNU
Lesser General Public License [Aharony et al., 2012]. Since its launch in October of
2011, hundreds of developers have used the framework in their own application devel-
opment. Many of the safeguards originally put in place to protect the participants of
the study were carried over to the open source project with 32 probes being surfaced
for developers to tap into.
1. Location: Records the most accurate location available for the device, given
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Figure 2-2: Funf Functional Flow Diagram
device limitations and respecting battery life.
2. Bluetooth: Detects Bluetooth devices within range..
3. Wifi: Records available wifi access points..
4. Cell: Records ids for the current cell tower the device is connected to.
5. Contacts: Detailed information about the contacts available to the device.
Sensitive information is one way hashed to ensure user privacy.
6. Call Log: Records the calls that are made by the device. Sensitive information
is normalized and hashed consistently and can be compared to contacts on this
device, or with other devices..
7. SMS: Messages sent and received by this device using SMS. Sensitive data is
hashed for user privacy.
8. Accelerometer Sensor: Measures the acceleration applied to the device. All
values are in SI units (m/s 2).
9. Gravity Sensor: A three dimensional vector indicating the direction and mag-
nitude of gravity. Units are m/s 2 . The coordinate system is the same as is used
by the acceleration sensor.
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10. Linear Acceleration Sensor: Records a three dimensional vector indicating
acceleration along each device axis, not including gravity. All values have units
of m/s 2 . The coordinate system is the same as is used by the acceleration
sensor. The output of the accelerometer, gravity and linear-acceleration sensors
obey the following relation: acceleration = gravity + linear-acceleration
11. Gravity Sensor: Measures angular speed around each axis. All values are
in radians/second and measure the rate of rotation around the X, Y and Z
axis. The coordinate system is the same as is used for the acceleration sensor.
Rotation is positive in the counter-clockwise direction. That is, an observer
looking from some positive location on the x, y, or z axis at a device positioned
on the origin would report positive rotation if the device appeared to be rotating
counter clockwise. Note that this is the standard mathematical definition of
positive rotation and does not agree with the definition of roll given earlier.
12. Orientation Sensor: Measures orientation of device. All values are angles in
degrees.
13. Rotation Vector Sensor: The rotation vector represents the orientation of
the device as a combination of an angle and an axis, in which the device has
rotated through an angle 0 around an axis < x, y, z >. The three elements of
the rotation vector are < x * sin(0/2), y * sin(0/2), z * sin(0/2) >, such that
the magnitude of the rotation vector is equal to sin(0/2), and the direction of
the rotation vector is equal to the direction of the axis of rotation. The three
elements of the rotation vector are equal to the last three components of a unit
quaternion < cos(0/2), x * sin(0/2), y * sin(/2), z * sin(0/2) >. Elements of
the rotation vector are unitless. The x, y, and z axis are defined in the same
way as the acceleration sensor.
14. Activity: Records how active the person is. Uses the AccelerometerProbe data
to calculate how many intervals the variance of a device's acceleration is above
a certain threshold. Intervals are 1 seconds long.
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15. Light Sensor: Detects the ambient light level in SI lux units.
16. Proximity Sensor: How far the front of the device is from an object. Most
implementations of this uses the light sensor and outputs a zero distance if
something is against the face of the device, and a nonzero distance if nothings
is against the face of the device.
17. Magnetic Field Sensor: Detect the local magnetic field. Can be used as to
detect the earth's magnetic field, but may be distorted by metal objects around
device.
18. Pressure Sensor: Records the pressure on the touch screen of the devices.
19. Temperature Sensor: Used to record temperature. Implementation depends
on the device and does not exist on all devices. Some will record temperature
of battery, others temperature of CPU or environment.
20. Android Info: Information about the version of Android the device is running.
21. Battery: Information about the type and current state of the battery in the
device.
22. Hardware Info: Details about the specific hardware the device is running,
including component identifiers.
23. Time Offset: Checks NTP servers to determine the devices current offset from
the time servers.
24. Telephony: Records telephony hardware, software, and account information.
25. Running Applications: The current running stack of applications.
26. Applications: What applications are installed on the device. Also specifies
applications that were uninstalled.
27. Screen: Records when the screen turns off and on.
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28. Browser Bookmarks: Records the bookmarks stored in the browser.
29. Browser Searches: Records the searches made in the browser.
30. Videos: Information about video files on the device.
31. Audio Files: Information about audio files on the device.
32. Images: Information about image files on the device.
Once again, the default behavior of the framework was maintained from the study
and did not record human readable text for sensitive sensors and data types. Due to
the LGPL any derivative works that are distributed are required to release or submit
back their changes to the code base. Proprietary applications can still be built that
utilize Funf as a library, but any changes made to the library, itself, must be opened.
In this way it becomes possible to ensure transparency in the level of data collection
being performed by an application using the Funf framework.
2.4 Example of Improper Default Setting
A breach in trust occurs when a service does not meet the expectation of privacy for
a user. If the user has not read or does not understand the data and sensor access
permissions and/or privacy policy then there exists an assumption, by the user, as
to how their data is being handled and used. An expectation of usage stems from
a users perception of how a service works and what a reasonable need and handling
of data should be. This perceived expectation may be accurate to reality or vastly
different due to misunderstandings related to technology, business practices, normal
use cases, or may be due to actual data management issues (malicious or not).
It is in the interest of the app developer to ensure that the difference between
expected application behavior and actual is as minimal as possible. This section
explores a single case where sizable gaps existed between assumption and actual data
handling and the resolutions of that case.
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2.4.1 Path Uploads Entire Address Book to Servers
In February of 2012 the social networking app Path, best known for its attempt to
create a more personal, trusted, network with a 150 friend limit, was discovered to be
uploading the contents of iPhone and Android users' address books to their servers
by the third party developer Arun Thampi [Thampi, 2012]. Full names, emails, and
phone numbers were all uploaded. Dave Morin, the CEO of Path, quickly responded
to the growing coverage of the situation with a full apology and explained that the
data was being collected only to facilitate the "Add Friends" feature [Morin, 2012].
This feature allowed Path to identify and notify you if people in your address book
were also using Path or later joined the service. However, despite the explanation,
Path recognized that it had failed to meet the expectations of its users and deleted
all contact data stored on their servers and quickly released an opt-in version of the
feature.
It is important to note that there were no perceivable malicious intents for the
collection and use of the data. However; users, bloggers, and journalists were not
responding to the intents of Path, but to their method of implementation. It was
considered a violation of privacy where the expectations of the user failed to match
the reality.
The application of discovering your friends on a service is a very valuable feature,
and is one necessary for Path and other social networking applications to grow. This
was, likely, simply the case of a developer taking the shortest route to complete a
task. If the defaults of data collection had been for no human readable text to pass
from the address book to the application, it would have still been just as easy to
implement the friend discovery feature without compromising the contact details of
all of a user's contacts. In fact, two months after the start of the Path privacy
debacle, they announced that they would be reimplementing the feature by hashing
the contact information before sending [pat, 2012].
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Chapter 3
Funf In a Box Application
Deployment and Analysis of Use
An application known as Funf In a Box was developed to give early stage researchers
and developers, as well as non-technical users, the ability to create mobile sensing
Android applications via a simple-to-use web interface, in under five minutes. A user
was simply required to connect their Dropbox account, check off the data they wanted
to collect, and the app (and later, their data) would appear in their Dropbox. The
app could then be distributed manually or through the Android Market for a study,
used by an individual to monitor their own data, or by a developer or researcher
to quickly prototype and test an application to determine necessary data collection
types and rates.
This chapter examines the structure of the Funf In a Box application and its
implementation. Additionally, it looks at the more than 500 apps that were built
and deployed using Funf In a Box between February and July of 2012 [Sumter et al.,
2012]. Thanks to the nature of the Funf In a Box project as a prototyping tool with
an equally low barrier to entry for all sensors on the phone, and with 500+ application
created by individuals from fifty-six different countries over the time examined, it be-
comes possible to look at the perceived connection between sensors and datatypes for
developers. Additionally, it is possible to highlight areas for focus and consideration
for privacy researchers.
35
3.1 Structure and Walkthrough of Funf In a Box
Knowing that Funf in a Box was intended for those who may or may not have any
technical background, we wanted to avoid the requirements of programming, server
setup, or forcing a user to use software (such as an sql interface) that they were
not familiar with. Thus, we developed a web-based system to move a user through
creating a Dropbox account all the way to processing their data into files that could
be opened in a data viewer such as Excel or Google Spreadsheets.
Funf.org I Info
fun inabox
Funf in a Box helps you create your own mobile sensing android app - no programming
required. Simply connect your dropbox account check off the data you want to collect, and
the app (and later, your data) will appear in your Dropbox. Take the app, distribute it
manually or through the Android Market for a study. Then forget about managing a server
for data collection. It's all in your Dropbox Wherever you are.
In .,*1hm befo 0re you , st rL"
This software is still in beta, so there are no guarantees it will work perfectly. It's not our
fault if you do anything stupid with Funf in a Box. So. if you get in trouble or do something
idiotic then don't come complaining to us.
Warning
The current beta release of Funf In a Box has a security vulnerability that could allow a
user of your app access to your other users' data. Exploiting this vulnerability requires
having hold of your Android app package (.apk), programming skills, and is not trivial to
implement. Nevertheless, until fixed, it is recommended that you do not use Funf In a Box
for large scale studies where you do not control the devices or trust the participants, or
release the app on the Android Market. This is not a cross app issue.
If you have any questions, more information is available on the Info Dage. Otherwise, go
ahead and...
Get Started!
Figure 3-1: Introduction Page for Funf In a Box
Funf in a Box was integrated with Dropbox to eliminate the need to host a ded-
icated server to collect data. Dropbox is a free file hosting service. Files that are
saved to Dropbox are automatically saved to all other computers owned by the user,
phones and even the Dropbox website. If the user did not already have a Dropbox
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account they would be prompted to visit www.dropbox.com/register and sign up.
Get free space! Cody Sumter v
9 Dropbox
fanf *
The app Funf In A Box would like to
connect with your Dropbox.
This app will create a folder named Funf In A Box in your Dropbox. The app will
only have access to this folder.
Please make sure you trust this app before proceeding.
You're currently logged in as codysumter@gmail.com. If you meant to connect
from another account, you can Iogout.
Aow Deny
Figure 3-2: Granting Dropbox Access Permissions for Funf In a Box
For the purposes of deployment it was recommended that users install the Dropbox
application on their computer. This was not required, but it would allow them to
process their data without having to download the entire folder from the web interface
as it could be rather large once an application was deployed and data was syncing
back. To begin the creation of a Funf In a Box app, a user would be directed to
www.funf.org/inabox and click Get Started! This would redirect them to Dropbox
where they may have to sign in. Dropbox would ask for the user to confirm that they
want Funf in a Box to have access to a folder in their Dropbox. By clicking Allow
the application flow would continue.
Next, the user would be directed to the application form. The information from
this form was to be used to build their own Funf in a Box Android app. For auditing
purposes seen in later sections of this chapter we required some basic information on
who they were, why they were collecting data, and what data they were collecting.
Users who installed their app would also be able to see some of the information
provided, and a method to contact the app creator if they were to run into problems.
Each sensor could be enabled by checking the box to the left of its name. Optionally
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they could customize the rate at which the probe would scan. In the case that they
left those fields blank we would choose reasonable defaults.
Funf.org I Info
ftn ina ox
Genera (dfisplayeodin app)
App Name:
Contact Email:
Description:
Your Name:
Your Email:
Organization Name:
Location:
C0 nf qurall cn
The following are the default data collection and configuration settings. They can be
modified at Dropbox/Funt In A Box/{Your App Name)/configfunf-config.json.
41Aut-1omati1c , p iod
( Over Wi-Fl or mobile network I
Note: You can always manually upload using the "Sync Now' menu option in the app.
Devi ce
U Android info every seconds
0 Battery Info every seconds
1 Hardware Info every seconds
MnWhila luswnrir infn AVaru
Figure 3-3: First Part of Probe Selection Page for Funf In a Box
When they were done they simply had to hit "Create your App!" They would then
be taken to a completion screen, and their app would be uploaded to their Dropbox in
the next several minutes. To use/deploy their Funf In a Box app they would next need
to locate their app directory by opening their Dropbox ("My Documents\Dropbox"
on Windows, Dropbox in their home directory on a Mac). Inside their dropbox would
be an Apps folder, and inside of that would be the Funf In A Box folder. This is
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where all of the apps they might create would appear. The folder for their app would
be named the same as the name they gave your application.
" data - All of the processed and raw data will be in this directory.
" raw - The raw encrypted (and later decrypted) files.
" scripts - Executable scripts that will decrypt, merge, and transform the data.
" config - The configuration for an app, for Funf, and auto-generated encryption
passwords.
" appname-release.apk - The Android application that will collect data.
Figure 3-4: An Example Funf In a Box App
At this point the Funf in a Box Android application in their app folder would
be ready for distribution. They could either release the app to the Android Market
39
(where many people could download it) or control the release manually. Both pro-
cesses are documented on the Android website [Google, 2012]. By default Android
users can only install apps from the the Android Play Store. If a Funf In a Box
user manually released the app by email, on a website, or by sharing a public link
from their Dropbox they would also have to instruct your users to enable application
installations from unknown sources on their Android device. This option could easily
be found in the Android settings under Application Settings or Security.
Finally, several hours after the data collecting application was installed, it would
start to send encrypted data files to the creator's Dropbox. They could find those
files in their app directory, inside the /data/raw folder. While they can see the files,
the data cannot be viewed directly from these files. First, they must be processed.
Processing would decrypt these files and merge them into one database file (an SQLite
database file). By running the scripts/process-data script by double clicking it on their
platform (Windows and Mac supported, for Linux they would need to run the python
script directly ). Processing was and is time depending on how much data that was
collected, to date. When finished the user would have a file called all-data.db inside
their data directory.
At this point, the user could either browse the data directly from this file using an
SQLite browser or they could run the "scripts/convert to csv" script to generate CSV
files from the database file. A CSV file will be generated for each probe, and they could
open them in a spreadsheet application (Excel, Open Office, Google Spreadsheets).
3.2 Demographics of the Funf In a Box Userbase
The 544 Funf In a Box apps that were generated between February and July of
2012 represented a wide range of users from academia, business, and the quantified-
self movement. Some were utilizing the service for personal data-collection. Some
for prototyping potential business concepts. Others for small-scale research deploy-
ments. In total, apps were deployed by Funf In a Box participants in fifty-six different
countries.
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Figure 3-5: Map of Funf In a Box App Developer Origins
In the app creation flow we asked for a set of contextual information from users in
order to gain an understanding of who they were and what they were using Funf In a
Box for. Additionally, some of the data was used to add information to the generated
app, itself.
" App Name - To be displayed as the name of the generated app.
" Contact Email - For app users to have someone to contact.
" Description - Explanation for the app and the data use cases intended by the
developer or researcher.
" Person's Name - For internal use.
" Email - For feedback and institute analysis.
" Organization - Academic, Individual, or Corporate.
" Location - For analytics.
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Table 3.1: Top Ten Countries for Funf In a Box Usage
Country Number of Apps
United States 182
South Korea 30
United Kingdoms 31
Germany 24
India 24
Brazil 19
Canadas 10
Switzerland 14
Netherlands 12
Australia 8
The names of both the individuals and apps are of little relevance outside of
recognizing that the most common name was BLANK followed distantly by David.
For the purposes of clustering demographics, email was determined to not be as useful
as initially anticipated given that gmail accounts represented an order of magnitude
lead over the next account domain. The next account type below gmail's two hundred
and ninety-nine that did not belong to another non-institute specific email provider
was MIT with twenty. In total, one hundred and seventeen individuals came from
unique email providers, providing an exceptionally long tail and reinforcing the diverse
origin set of users illustrated by the country breakdown.
Likewise, organization designations were of a similar diverse nature. After manual
processing to collapse various methods of listing the same organizations there existed
two hundred and sixty distinct listings, including the two hundred and seventeen that
elected not to list a parent organization (it is anticipated that many of these were
individuals).
Finally, using the description provided with each app we did a simple word fre-
quency analysis (represent here as a word cloud) to highlight the most commonly
used words in the descriptions. To reduce noise, commonly used english words such
as " a, "an'', and "the" were removed from the sample set. The result can be seen in
Figure 3-6. As can be seen in the word cloud, through anticipating the use cases of
Funf In a Box, and by reading a sampling of the descriptions of the generated apps
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Figure 3-6: Funf In a Box Description Wordle
the dominant use case of the service was to prototype and test applications for data
collection. Further, there is prominence of much of the terminology used to describe
the types of sensor data collection that the apps intended to do, which we will cover
in the next section.
3.2.1 Examination of General Use Patterns
With several hundred developers and researchers using the Funf In a Box service, it
was possible to examine what data types were most sought after by researchers and
developers of mobile sensing applications. Such an analysis of both Funf In a Box
and general Android permissions could provide an early indicator for where to focus
privacy research. If, for instance, we were to see a spike in prototype applications
tapping into the Applications Probe, we may seek to determine if there are any
specific privacy concerns that may need to be addressed before a spike in deployed
applications has actually occurred. In such a way it might be possible to address
privacy issues before they arise. While the data presented in this chapter does not
provide that trending analysis, as it is over too short of a time period, it does provide
an establishing baseline of present interest in prototype applications that rests inline
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Figure 3-8: Funf in a Box Apps' Number of Probes Selected
3.2.2 Examination of Pair Use Patterns
Of greater interest than solely examining the specific sensors used in an app is the
examination of sensors selected in tandem for an app. By taking the 544 unique apps
we can compute a link strength between any two sensors or probes to denote the
likelihood of finding Probe B given that we observe Probe A in an app (Figure 3.2).
Likewise, for Probe B to Probe A. This link strength for each of the five-hundred
and sixty-one pairs can then be ranked to examine the most likely probe or sensor
combinations. For Funf In a Box, Battery and Location were the two probes with the
highest link strength - a potential indication of the concern over the battery-drain
experienced by many users of location-based apps. Indeed, fifty percent of the top
ten spots are pairs between a given probe and the battery probe which speaks to the
difficulty of balancing sensor collection rates and energy consumption [Rachuri et al.,
].
By visualizing this in a network structure in Figure 3-9 we can see the tendency
of the most prominent probes, which also happen to be the physical sensors clustered
45
largely in the interior structure, surrounded by the less tightly connected probes such
as Browser Bookmarks, Contact, and Videos. This can give us a more at-a-glance
abstracted view to see the same clustering around Location and Battery that we could
see in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Funf In a Box Probe Interaction Set (top 10)
By isolating one particular probe and examining the link strengths for it to all
other probes we can, additionally, see common pairings or note instances of probes
that do not have an inherently higher or lower affinity for particular other probes.
Isolation of the battery probe in Figure 3-10 highlights the Location, Telephony,
Temperature, and Activity probes by visual inspection. Similar preferences can be
seen in the graphs for Location, Activity, and Cell. However, as seen in Figure 3-14
we can see an example of a probe that does not have a high preference for a particular
set of other probes. This phenomena was generally seen in the software based probes
and not in the hardware based probes.
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Probe A Probe B Link Strength
Battery Location 178.0
Cell Location 163.0
Telephony Battery 162.0
AndroidInfo Battery 155.0
Telephony AndroidInfo 155.0
Location Wifi 153.0
Activity Location 151.0
Wifi Cell 146.0
Battery Cell 142.0
Wifi Battery 142.0
Figure 3-9: Pair Link Strength Graph
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Figure 3-10: Pair Link Strength Graph - Battery Focus
bOWw8mmu
3s
Figure 3-11: Pair Link Strength Graph - Location Focus
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Figure 3-13: Pair Link Strength Graph - Cell Focus
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Chapter 4
Conclussion
4.1 Contributions
This thesis examined the use of two techniques for compelling transparency in data
access and use by mobile application developers. Additionally, it explored the feasibil-
ity of using a mobile application prototyping service as a way to observe and predict
trends and connections for future sensor usage to provide privacy researchers a head-
start in considering best-practices. In so doing, we made the following conclusions
and contributions:
1. Privacy-conscious default settings in open and closed source data and sensor
collection libraries are feasible without inhibiting useful function.
2. Appropriate defaults were shown to result in the same end-goal as real-world
case studies while by-passing the stated privacy incidents.
3. Reciprocity characteristics of certain copyleft licenses and auditing mechanisms
for proprietary frameworks allow for enforced transparency both during the
development phase (for the company) and post-release (for the public).
4. Meaningful value can be extracted from looking at the sensor types selected in
prototype applications to understand and prepare for potential industry trends
before they reach the market.
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This direction of investigation was sought as, for the time being, technical solutions
are more readably deployable than overarching legislative changes. These techniques
were additionally tested in the deployment of the Friends and Family study, the
Funf SDK, and Funf in a Box tools. Through these it was possible to show that
implementing a sensor and data collection framework with privacy-conscious defaults
was feasible and did not adversely impact the power or functionality of the framework.
4.2 Future work
4.2.1 Implementation and Testing of Autonomous Auditing
Systems
In chapter 2 we highlight a theoretical system for application auditing either through
the use of the reciprocity characteristics of certain copyleft licenses or the control given
through the application of a closed-source system. However, beyond the demonstra-
tion of default setting and comparative investigation of the structure, advantages,
and disadvantages an auditing system is not deployed and tested. A reasoned next
step would be the deployment of the audit process through either the open-source or
closed-source method for testing in the real-world.
4.2.2 Prototyping Analysis
Chapter 3 investigated the static state of the Funf In a Box service's five-hundred
and forty-four apps that were built and deployed between February and July of 2012.
While a suitable amount of time to gain a snapshot of the present state of users, it
was not sufficient for ecosystem trend analysis. Additionally, it would be beneficial
to gain information to segment users by institute type (commercial, academic, and
personal) and compare with sensor selection in deployed apps to provide a secondary
baseline and time differential between prototype trend emergence and deployment
trend emergence.
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Appendix A
Tables
Table A.1: Funf In a Box Probe Interaction Set
Probe A Probe B Link Strength
Battery
Cell
Telephony
AndroidInfo
Telephony
Location
Activity
Wifi
Battery
Wifi
LightSensor
Activity
Battery
AccelerometerSensor
Telephony
AccelerometerFeatures
Location
Location
Battery
Battery
AndroidInfo
Wifi
Location
Cell
Cell
Battery
Location
AccelerometerSensor
HardwareInfo
LinearAcceleration
Cell
Location
178.0
163.0
162.0
155.0
155.0
153.0
151.0
146.0
142.0
142.0
140.0
139.0
139.0
139.0
139.0
138.0
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 - Continued from previous page
Probe A Probe B Link Strength
AndroidInfo
TemperatureSensor
Battery
Telephony
Telephony
Activity
OrientationSensor
Location
OrientationSensor
RotationVectorSensor
Bluetooth
Activity
AccelerometerSensor
Telephony
Battery
Location
LightSensor
TemperatureSensor
Location
GravitySensor
GyroscopeSensor
Activity
TemperatureSensor
Battery
Location
TemperatureSensor
LightSensor
HardwareInfo
Location
AccelerometerSensor
Wifi
HardwareInfo
AccelerometerFeatures
RotationVectorSensor
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Figure B-1: Map of Funf In a Box Users in the United States of America
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Figure B-2: Funf In a Box App Creation Breakdown by Week
Chrome 63%
Android Browser 2%
Internet Explorer 8%
irefox 24%
Figure B-3: Browsers of Funf In a Box Users
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